South Carolina Law Review
Volume 21

Issue 1

Article 10

1969

Recent Decisions

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1969) "Recent Decisions," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 21 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

et al.: Recent Decisions

RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Appointment-Fourteenth amendment's equal proteciion clause permits no substantial variation
from equal population in voting districts of local government
having general governmental powers over geographic area.
Avery v. M dland County (Sup. Ct. 1968).
The petitioner, a Midland County voter, challenged a Texas
Supreme Court ruling that his county government, called a
Commissioners Court, did not necessarily violate the fourteenth
amendment by maintaining election districts of substantially
unequal population. The court was composed of five commissioners, four of whom were elected from single member districts
while the fifth was elected at large. Population estimates for
1963 showed that district populations ranged from 67,906 in
one district, which contained the county's only city, to 852, 414,
and 828 in the others. The Commissioners Court's duties were
fixed by a state constitutional provision and by statute to be
those of a "general governing body of the county." The duties
included maintaining a courthouse and jail, appointing minor
officials and filling vacancies, letting contracts, building roads
and bridges, setting tax rates, issuing bonds, and adopting a
county budget. The court also had power to build a hospital and
an airport, fix school district boundaries, and determine the
districts of its own members.
The lower court found for the petitioner, holding that the state
constitution's apportionment standard, "for the convenience of
the people," had been violated. The court, in ordering the county
to adopt a plan with substantially equal population in each district, decided the issue under a Texas constitutional provision
rather than under the United States Constitution. A Texas court
of civil appeals reversed on the ground that neither state nor
federal law required that local governmental districts be drawn
according to population.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the civil appeals court,
holding that the county's scheme was impermissible on the same
grounds as had the district court. But the supreme court held
that the county's districts need not be based on substantially
equal population. It stated that such factors as the number of
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qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of roads, and taxable values could be considered.
The United States Supreme Court decided that the Texas
Supreme Court's judgment required no further proceedings in
state courts and constituted a final judgment that equally populated districts were not required on the local level,
The United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded. The United States Constitution requires that representation in local governments with general governmental powers
over an entire geographic area may not be apportioned among
single member districts of substantially unequal population.
Avery v. Midland County, 88 S. Ct. 1114 (1968).
From the moment it was handed down in 1964, Reynolds v.
Sims' signaled an era of uncertainty for local government. Not
least among the questions raised by its application of "one man,
one vote" to state legislatures was its likely impact on apportionment in local government elections. If the United States Constitution's equal protection clause required voting districts of
substantially equal population on the local level, representation
in an indeterminate number of the nation's 81,253 local governments, including 3,049 county bodies, stood the risk of being
found unconstitutional.
Soon after its formulation, the Reynolds "one man, one vote"
doctrine was affirmatively applied by lower courts to city
councils, county governments, and school boards.2 However,
some cases, basing their holdings on pre-Reynods decisions, held
that the doctrine should be confined to state legislative apportionment.8
In 1967, two United States Supreme Court cases, Sailors V.
Board of EducatioO4 and DusA v. Davis,5 indicated a likelihood
that once the appropriate case arose, the Court would extend
the "one man, one vote" standard to local governments. Around
Reynolds, meanwhile, swirled a debate whether the equal population principle was too simplistic for functionally varied governments such as those on the local level. Some observers con1. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2. See Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Reapportionment-Effect of One Man,
One Vote Principle on Local Government Below the State Legislative Level,
19 S.C.L. R.y. 839, 841-42 (1967).
3. Id. at 842.

4. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
5. 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
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tended that it was appropriate to distinguish local governments
with administrative characteristics from those purely legislative
in character. Others were concerned by what appeared to be
very flexible standards for deciding proper apportionment. 6
Reynolds insisted on a distribution based on substantial population equality among voting districts. It left to the lower courts
the task of deciding permissible variances and other factors a
state might use to supplement its equal population basis. Dusoh,
for instance, had indicated that a candidate residency requirement was not repugnant so long as each vote had equal -weight.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Reynolds suggested that more flexibility was desirable in apportionment standards for state legislatures than for congressional
districts, due to their structural differences. This suggestion led
to conjecture that even greater latitude was in the offing for
local governments.7
In this last regard, Avery may not have lived up to the expectations. It seemed to brush aside any differences in its
recognition that dilution of votes on the local level due to malapportionment is identical in effect to that on the state level.
It applied the Reynolds holding, without substantial variation, to
any local government having "general governmental powers."8
In doing so, it dispelled remaining doubts whether the jurisdictional reservations of Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections 9and Glass v. Hancock County Election Cornission'° in
applying "one man, one vote" to local government had been
undermined by the Reynolds effect on voting standards of state
legislatures.
Avery held that a local government with "general governmental powers" included a county government having the "power
to make a large number of decisions having a broad range of
impacts on all the citizens of the county.""1 The powers which
it felt fell into this category included the setting of a tax rate,
equalizing assessments, issuing bonds, and adopting a budget
6. See Comment, supra note 2, at 840.

7. Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLunr. L. REv. 21,
25 (1965).

8. Avery v. Midland County, 88 S. Ct 1114, 1120 (1968).

9. 43 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
10. 250 Miss. 40, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963), appeal dismissed, 378 U.S. 558
(1964).
11. 88 S. Ct. at 1119. For an earlier concurring opinion reaching an analogous
conclusion see Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 831, 836 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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which in itself may include decisions
about roads, recreation,
12
school lands, and new industry.
The Court conceded that local governments similar to that in
Midland County contain a blend of administrative, legislative,
and judicial functions. It alluded to the attorneys' insistence
that one or more of these characteristics should control whether
a local government is governed by the "one man, one vote"
doctrine. Although the majority did not appear to reject such
an approach, the opinion seemed to be trying to avoid these
labels in favor of applying the doctrine to local governments
with "general governmental powers." Since the opinion never
expressly defined this term, its limits are not altogether clear.
A great deal of the ambiguity stems from the Court's discussion
of what it considered as "general governmental powers." For
example, the opinion noted that "while the Texas Supreme Court
found that the Commissioners Court's legislative functions are
'negligible', . . . the court does have power to make a large
number of decisions having a broad range of impacts on all the
citizens of the county.' i8 This language would seem to indicate
the majority is attempting to distinguish "legislative" activities
from the type of "power" deemed controlling in the definition of
"general governmental powers." But when viewed from the
opinion's stress in following paragraphs on authorized (though
perhaps unused) powers instead of daily functions being determinative in defining "general governmental powers," this
language is susceptible to yet another interpretation. The majority may be simply indicating that it is legislative power, among
others, and not the "negligible" legislative functions which
governs. Midland County was a government in which there was
disparity between the extent of its powers and its daily functions. From this second interpretation the otherwise amorphous
term "general governmental powers" gathers some substance.
Some support for this second interpretation may be gained
from two other features of the decision. Some of the powers
which the majority listed as indicative of "general governmental
powers"--setting tax rates, equalizing assessments, issuing bonds,
and adopting a budget-are themselves very similar to those
traditionally viewed as legislative. 14 Moreover, in preliminary
discussion of which governmental bodies should be governed by
the "one man, one vote" doctrine, the majority stated:
12. 88 S. Ct. at 1119-20.
13. Id. at 1119.
14. See 24A WORDS AND PHRASES 530-34, 536-45 (1966).
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When the State apportions its legislature, it must have
due regard for the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly,
when the State delegates lawmaking power to local
government and provides for the election of local officials from districts specified by statute, ordinance, or
local charter, it must insure that those qualified to vote
have the right to an equally effective voice in the
election process. 15
The use of the term "lawmaking power," which is the meaning of
"legislative," can be viewed as having some significance in interpreting what the court subsequently said about "general
governmental powers."
In view of the brevity of the majority opinion, however, and
the care with which the majority avoided using the terms "lawmaking" or "legislative" powers in defining "general governmental powers," the foregoing interpretation must be considered
conjecture. A more reliable approach is to accept the decision's
definition of "general governmental powers," for what it appears
to be-uncertain beyond the limited meaning which the majority
provided.
The Texas Supreme Court had determined that the Midland
County government was in fact primarily a rural road commission in its daily activities. The Avery majority countered this
observation by letting its test turn on what a particular government was authorized to do and not upon what it actually chose
to do. Avery also rejected the contention raised in behalf of
rural constituents that malapportionment is permissible whenever some of the voters have a greater stake in a local government's acts than other voters. Justice Fortas dissented on this
issue, arguing that "one man, one vote" should not apply to a
general government characterized by rural voters having a greater stake in the acts of government than their non-rural neighbors.
The majority concluded that the over-riding consideration in
any event must be the local government's potential for levying
burdens, such as taxes, on the entire electorate. Denial of the
"greater stake" theory by the majority does not seem unwarranted, since the doctrine appears to shade off rapidly into
political questions of whose "stakes" ought to prevail.
The majority nonetheless recognized the existence of a "special
purpose unit" in local government with functions "affecting
15. 88 S. Ct. at 1118.
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definable groups of constituents more than other constituents." 16
The voting districts in these units, the Court noted, might be
apportioned to give greater weight to the votes of citizens most
affected by the unit's decisions. Implying that the presence of
rural interests did not alter the general nature of the Midland
County government, the Court said the case presented no "special purpose unit" question. A definition of such units and their
apportionment standards was reserved until presented in a
proper case.
The apportionment test announced in Avery retained intact
the Reynolds language requiring substantially equal numbers of
voters in districts and added no new apportionment guidelines
for lower courts on what may constitute permissible variances.
Nor did Av&e2y acknowledge as relevant in local apportionment
such factors as miles of country roads, land area, geography,
number of qualified voters, and taxable values, which were considered by the Texas Supreme Court. The Texas court had
contended that equal population was not the "sole basis"'17 for
fair apportionment. It had said that under the circumstances,
the above-mentioned factors might be utilized in a "rational
variance" of a strict population standard. 18 The Texas court
had then concluded, somewhat equivocally, by intimating that
equal population might even be completely discarded in some
cases.
Thus the Supreme Court apparently chose to conclude that the
question before it was an either/or inquiry of whether the "one
man, one vote" basis could ever be overlooked entirely or perhaps
subordinated in the apportionment of a local government's
voting districts. Finding that it could not, the majority evidently
decided that resolving the issue of whether any variance could
ever include these five factors was unnecessary upon the facts
presented, although the existing Midland County apportionment
scheme raised the question of what role these factors play in
such a plan and the Texas Supreme Court's reversal also relied
on these factors. Justice White's majority opinion left the
degree of their applicability unanswered. The implication is
that the Supreme Court preferred to meet them and the variance
issue at another time upon facts which first presented a plan
based substantially on equal population. Later in the opinion,
16. Id. at 1120.
17. Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W2d 422, 428 (Tex. 1966).
18. Id.
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the Court, as in Reynolds, recognized that equal protection may
allow recognition of some distinctions between citizens, but
Avery defined them only as those not "artibrary or invidious." 19
If Avery does not expressly hold that the only criterion for
district apportionment is substantially equal population, it insists that equal population always be the primary criterion, unless
the question involves school, park, sewage, water or fire districts,
whose functions as potential special purpose bodies may affect
the interests of less than the whole electorate.
In its strictest interpretation, Avery governed only county
governments whose powers are configured substantially like
Midland County's. Yet the powers of the Midland County
government are broad enough to suggest the decision may
encompass nearly all general county governments with a district
voting system. It is plain that the Court intended to indicate its
views on apportionment for the districts of any local government
of general powers. The majority found "little difference, in
terms of the application of the Equal Protection Clause and of
the principles of Reynolds v. Sims, between the exercise of state
power through legislatures and its exercise by elected officials
in cities, towns, and counties." 20 It made clear that its holding
19. 88 S. Ct. at 1120. Although Avery postponed resolving the issue of
rational variances from the strict population standard when applied in local
elections, Reynolds provides some indication of the Court's views on that
subject. Reynolds accepted the proposition for state legislatures that some
divergence from a strict population standard in apportioning districts is
permissible under the fourteenth amendment if "based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy ..

. " 377 U.S. at

579. It rejected as legitimate, however, any divergence based on considerations
of historical, economic, or group interests, "[c]onsiderations of area alone," Id.
at 579-80, or voter residence, Id. at 563, 566, 567. This theory of rational
variances would seem to reject a variance based on the five factors urged in
Avery by the Texas Supreme Court and make the factors incompatible with
the strict population standard whenever employed. But in this respect,
Reynolds may not be conclusive with respect to local governments. For in
Avery, the majority opinion observed that the Reynolds' conclusion held unacceptable "bases other than population . . . for distinguishing among citizens
when . . . used to elect members of state legislatures. [The Court held] only
that the Constitution permits no substantial variation from equal population in
drawing districts for units of local government ... ." 88 S. Ct. at 1120
(emphasis added). Thus the door may remain open for rational variances on
the local level not permitted for state legislative districts, as long as the
equal population standard is the primary apportionment standard in a particular
plan.
One commentator has concluded that although Reynolds gave lip-service to
"rationality," the decision in effect discarded that test. He interpreted that
Court's rejection of the rational considerations above as a step toward the
adoption of a different standard and one which required that even a minor
variance be justified by more than a rational state policy test. Comment, Apportionmnent and the Courts-A Synopsis and Prognosis: Herein of Gerryvianders and Other Dragons, 59 Nw. U.L. Rav. 500, 528-30 & n.139 (1964).
20. 88 S. Ct. at 1118.
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applied to any local government "with general responsibility for
local affairs."2 1 Extension of these concepts to other types of
local government with such powers is an inevitable next step in
the "one man, one vote" movement.
Justice Stewart, one of three dissenters in Avery, disagreed
with the majority's employment of the equal protection clause
against local government, just as he had inveighed against its
application against state legislatures. In separate dissents, Justices Harlan and Fortas disagreed with the majority's holding
that there was enough finality or necessity for a decision on the
merits. 22 On the merits, however, they objected to subjecting
local government to the "one man, one vote" standard because
they believed it was an inflexible and simplistic approach.
In this regard, Avery did indeed rest upon a simplistic proposition that no local government of general powers may depart
significantly from an equal population standard, no matter how
pervasive its administrative or special purpose complexion. Al28
though it left unsettled a definition of a special purpose unit,
the concluding paragraphs of the majority opinion encourage
creation of the unit and other new bodies in answer to potential
problems of inflexibility when "one man, one vote" is applied
to local governments. Avery noted that it left undisturbed
24
Siaorsv. Board of Education,
implying that one such unit was
illustrated in that case by a school board essentially administrative in tasks and appointive in composition.
Rural interests which have a greater stake than non-rural
interests in the decisions of county government must look
elsewhere for protection, according to Avery. The majority
opinion intimated that a residency requirement for rural candidates or the creation of some form of special purpose unit may be
their only recourse.
Those South Carolina county governments whose officials
are elected by district and which possess the powers of a general
government fall within the Avery result. Those having voting
districts of significantly unequal population violate its standards.
21. Id. at 1119.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
23. A discussion of special purpose units is found in Weinstein, supra note
7, at 32-33.
24. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
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For those disappointed that Avery failed to acknowledge fully
the inherent complexity of local government, it should be noted
that the decision was only an initial and careful step into the
arena. Yet unsettled are those factual situations which will help
penetrate the varieties of local functionalism untouched by
Avery.
ROBERT 0. OoNoimuy
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CONSITUTIONAL LAW-Cruel and Unusual Punishment
-Criminal conviction of chronic alcoholic for violation of public
intoxication statute is not cruel and unusual punishment. Powell
,v. Texas (Sup. Ct. 1968).
The appellant was arrested in late December, 1966 and charged
with violating a Texas public intoxication statute.1 lie was
found guilty in the Corporation Court of Austin, Texas and
fined $20. An appeal was taken to the County Court of Travis
County, Texas, where a trial de novo was held. At this trial the
appellant's counsel stated that his client was a chronic alcoholic
and therefore his being in public while drunk was not an act
of his own volition, and to punish him criminally would be a
violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Federal Constitution. The trial judge concluded that chronic
alcoholism was not a defense to the charge of public intoxication
and found the appellant guilty, fining him $50. On appeal,2 the
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The Court felt it
was impossible, due to the present state of medical knowledge,
to conclude that chronic alcoholics suffer from such an irresistible
compulsion to drink that they cannot refrain from being drunk
in public. Therefore, criminal conviction of a chronic alcoholic
for public intoxication was not a violation of the guarantees of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. Powell v. Texas, 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968).
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
The cruel and unusual punishment clause was taken verbatim
from the English Declaration of Rights, 3 made a part of the
federal Bill of Rights,4 and adopted by most state constitutions. 5
The cruel and unusual punishment clause was adopted to insure
1. Tax. Pax. CODE ANN. art 477 (1952) provides: "Whoever shall get
drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any
private house except his own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred
dollars."
2. The appellant was able to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States from the county court because there was no further right of
appeal available under the Texas judicial system. TEx. CODE CPXU. P. ANN.
art 4.03 (1966).
3. Some authors contend that this right can even be traced back to the
Magna Charta or the laws of Edward the Confessor. See 34 MiNN. L. REV.
134, 135 (1950).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.

5. E.g, S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 19.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss1/10

10

et al.: Recent Decisions
SOUTH OAROLIxA LAW

REVW

[V-0l. 21

that atrocities" such as had occurred in England under the common law would not be repeated in America. It was originally
believed to apply only to methods of punishment but was later
extended to include prohibitions against excessive punishment. s
A new area under the cruel and unusual punishment clause
was opened in 1962 with the case of Robinon, v. Califomia.9
Although the eighth amendment had never specifically been
held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause,'0 Robison treated it as an accomplished fact.
In this case the Court held that a statute" which imprisoned a
person for his status as a narcotic addict, even though the person
had never engaged in irregular behavior, inflicted cruel and
unusual punishment. 1 2 In Driver v. Hinnant'3 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that public drunkenness also came within "status" convictions as enunciated by
Robinon because such public appearances while drunk were
involuntary symptoms of the disease of chronic alcoholism.
Thus, the court in Driver held that a criminal conviction of a
chronic alcoholic for public drunkeness violated the cruel and
6. Atrocities which had occurred were pointed out in Wilkerson v. Utah,

99 U.S. 130, 135 (1879). For example, a prisoner was dragged to the place of
execution, another was disemboweled alive, and yet another was beheaded and
quartered for high treason; there were cases of public dissection for murder,
and a female convicted of treason was burned alive.
7. It re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (dictum supporting electrocution as

a method of execution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (shooting
upheld as method of inflicting death when mode of execution was left to
court); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (requiring
convicts to work beyond their physical capacity held to be cruel and unusual
punishment); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) (sterilization
after conviction for rape held cruel and unusual punishment); State v.
Cannon, 190 A.2d 514 (Del. 1963) (flogging held not to be cruel and unusual
punishment); State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75 (1912) (sterilization
after conviction for statutory rape held not to be cruel and unusual punishment).
8. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (15 years at
hard labor while constantly chained at the wrist and ankle held excessive

punishment and violative of cruel and unusual punishment clause); State v.
Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948)

(sentence greater than

defendant's life expectancy after burglary conviction in which jury had recommended mercy held excessive under state cruel and unusual punishment clause).
9. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
10. Previous cases had strongly indicated that the eighth amendment did
apply to the states. In Louisiana ex. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459
(1947), the Court spoke as if the eighth amendment did apply to the states,

although they never decided that it actually did.

11. CAL. HEALTH AND SArETY CODE § 11721 (West 1957).

12. See generally Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the

Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 635, 645 (1966). See also 51
CAL. L. REv. 219 (1963).
13. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
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unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. 14 This
reasoning was followed in Easter v. Distict of Cobumbia.'5
Relying in part on certain statutes 16 and in part on Driver's
reasoning, the court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit concluded: "[T]hat public intoxication of a chronic
alcoholic lacks the essential element of criminality; and to convict such a person of that crime would also offend the Eighth
u7
Amendment."
The reasoning in Easter and Driver was not followed in
Powell v. Texas.'8 In Powell the Court decided that the current state of medical knowledge concerning alcoholism did
not permit the courts to establish a broad, new constitutional
principle which would prohibit using the criminal process to
deal with chronic alcoholics. As the Court pointed out: "Debate
ranges within the medical profession as to whether 'alcoholism'
is a separate 'disease' in any meaningful ... sense .... ,u1
Even if alcoholism is accepted as a disease, 20 there is little
consensus as to what constitutes the "manifestations of alcoholism," 2 ' and there was virtually no proof at the trial that the
appellant displayed any of these "manifestations."
Although the Court was not sufficiently convinced that alcoholism should be classified as a disease instead of only a social
problem, the majority felt that the appellant had not proved
that his alcoholism caused him to lose complete control over his
actions when drinking.2 2 The Court pointed out that there was
14. This case did not prohibit civil commitment of chronic alcoholics in

order to protect the public. Id. at 765.
15. 361 F2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
16. D.C. CODE §§ 24-501 to -514 (1961).
17. 361 F.2d at 55.
18. 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968).
19. Id. at 2149.
20. Comments to Myerson Speech, 19 S.C.L. REv. 347, 348 (1967). Dr.
Myerson suggests that alcoholism is not a traditional disease but stems from
social causes. But see Swartz, Compulsory Legal Measures and the Concept of
Illness, 19 S.C.L. REv. 372, 375 (1967).
21. See generally E. JLLINaxE, THE Disass CoNcEPT OF ALcOHoLIsm 35-41
(1960). Jellinek has five alcoholic types, only two of which he feels suffer from
alcoholism as a disease. He labels these two types the "gamma" and "delta"
alcoholic, whose manifestations are (1) acquired increased tissue tolerance to

alcohol, (2) adaptive cell metabolism, (3) withdrawal symptoms, and (4)

loss of control.
22. On cross-examination the appellant admitted he had had one drink
on the morning of the trial but had been able to discontinue drinking on that
occasion. The relevant part is as follows:

Q. You took that one at eight o'clock because you wanted to
drink?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you knew that if you drank it,you could keep on
drinking and get drunk?
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no proof that the appellant was either a "gamma" or "delta')
alcoholic, 23 there was no proof that he suffered withdrawal
symptoms, and in the majority's opinion the medical testimony
the compulsions to drink allegedly
at the trial did not clarify
24
suffered by the appellant.
Even though the majority decided that the appellant had failed
to prove his compulsion to drink was so overpowering as to
exculpate him for public drunkenness, they did not fail to
recognize alcoholism as one of the major social problems of the
day. The Court noted that there is no agreed-upon approach
and cure for alcoholism on a large scale. 2 5 The majority realized
that criminally punishing problem drinkers had not been very
fruitful but concluded that "[b]efore we condemn the present
practice across-the-board, perhaps we ought to be able to point
to some2 0clear promise of a better world for these unfortunate
people."
The appellant tried to bring his conviction within the holding
of Robinson v. Califonia by reasoning that his appearances in
public were not acts of his own volition but symptomatic of his
disease of alcoholism, and that punishment for these appearances
would be cruel and unusual. Even if the Court had accepted
"alcoholism" as a "disease," the majority believed the appellant
would still not be within the scope of protection against cruel
and unusual punishment enunciated by Robinson. The Court
distinguished Robinson by pointing out that there the crime was
"being addicted," a status, whereas in PoweZ the crime was
"being drunk in public," an act. The majority reasoned that
"[c]riminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has
committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society
A. Well, I was supposed to be here on trial, and I didn't take
but that one drink.
Q. You knew you had to be here this afternoon, but this
morning you took one drink and then you knew that you
couldn't afford to drink any more and come to court; is that
right?
A. Yes, sir, that's right.
Q. So you exercised your will power and kept from drinking
anything today except that one drink?
A. Yes, sir, that's right.
88 S. Ct. at 2147-48 (1968).
23. See note 21 mipra.
24. It was stated in the medical testimony that the appellant "suffered
from a compulsion [to drink] which was an 'exceedingly strong influence,'
but which was 'not completely overpowering' ... ." 88 S. Ct. at 2147.
25. See, e.g., JOINT INFORMATION SERVICE OF THE AmCAN PSYCHIATRIC
AsS'N AND THE NAT'L Ass'N FOR MENTAL HEALTH, THE TREATMENT OF
ALCOHo.-sm-A STUDY OF PROGRAMS AND PROBLEMS (1967).

26. 88 S.Ct. at 2153 (1968).
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has an interest in preventing

....

1127

The Court then decided

that being drunk in public was a punishable act, 28 that being
drunk in public was not a "condition" which the appellant was
unable to change as argued by the dissent, nor was it an act
symptomatic of his "disease" as the appellant had asserted at
trial.
In Powell v. Texas the Court has indicated that Robison v.
Califoia
was being extended farther than desired and that
Robinson should be limited to a more narrow view of its holding.
In Powell, the Supreme Court was unable to conclude, on the
state of the record or in light of medical knowledge, that the
appellant, or chronic alcoholics generally, suffered from such
irresistible compulsions to drink that they cannot refrain from
or be deterred from public intoxication.
DouGiAs McCumouGn

27. Id. at 2145-55.

28. Justice Marshall pointed out: "The State of Texas thus has not sought
to punish a mere status ....
Rather, it has imposed upon appellant a
criminal sanction for public behavior ... ." Id. at 2154.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Standing-Federal taxpayer has
standing to determine whether congressional spending program
violates specific constitutional limitations on taxing and spending powers of Congress. Flast v. Cohen (Sup. Ct. 1968).
The plaintiffs, relying solely on their status as federal taxpayers,1 brought suit in the district court to enjoin approval of
certain alleged unconstitutional expenditures of federal funds
made pursuant to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965.2 The funds in question were being used to finance
course instruction and to purchase textbooks and other related
materials for religious schools. The plaintiffs' theory was that
such expenditures tended to establish a religion in violation of
the establishment and free exercise clause of the first amendment.
The defendants, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
and the Commissioner of Education, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and a
three-judge court was convened to decide the question. The
three-judge court, one judge dissenting, concluded that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit and dismissed the
complaint. The Supreme Court, hekd, reversed. A federal taxpayer has standing to question the constitutional validity of a
congressional act -when that act is an exercise of the taxing and
spending power and allegedly violates a specific constitutional
limitation on that power. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968).
The judicial power of the United States, as defined by the
Constitution, may be exercised only in a proper case or con4
troversy 3 and a case to be proper must be adversary in nature.
Unless the litigants have standing their case lacks the necessary
1. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1945 (1968).

In their complaint the

plaintiffs asserted that they were federal taxpayers, qualified legal voters of
the United States, that one plaintiff was a real property taxpayer in the state
of New York, and that another plaintiff had children who regularly attended
the elementary or secondary public schools of New York. Flast v. Gardner,
267 F. Supp. 351, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). However, the three-judge court said
that "[iut is clear that if plaintiffs have standing to sue it is because they pay
federal income taxes." Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
3. U.S. CosT.art. III,§ 2; Muskrat v.United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
4. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911).
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adverseness to be considered proper.5 Thus the doctrine of standing is one aspect of the case-controversy requirement, 6 and as
such it has certain constitutional overtones. 7 Generally, to have
standing a litigant must have a personal stake in the outcome of
the litigation.8
In Frothingham,v. Mellon,9 the Supreme Court held that a
federal taxpayer, as such, had no standing to enjoin an expenditure of federal money as unconstitutional. There the taxpayer
alleged that the Maternity Act of 192110 violated the tenth
amendment and that expenditures from the general fund made
pursuant to this unconstitutional Act would increase her tax
burden, thereby taking her property without due process of law.
The Supreme Court dismissed the suit saying that the taxpayer's
interest in the money of the federal treasury was so small that
the possible effect of a present expenditure from the general fund
upon the taxpayer's future tax burden was too remote to afford
a basis "for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of
equity." !1 That is, Mrs. Frothingham suffered no direct injury
of the type necessary to confer standing. The FTothingham
decision was criticized 12 and confusion developed over whether
the Court's refusal to reach the merits had been discretionary or
required by the Constitution. 13 However, the decision was fol5. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1952-53 (1968) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962).
6. C.

(1963).

WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAwV OF FEDERAL COURTS

§ 13, at 36

7. Id. § 12, at 32-33.
8. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S. Ct 1942, 1952-53 (1968); Tileston v. Ullman,
318 U.S. 44 (1943); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). But see
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.

249 (1953); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
9. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
10. Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224.

11. 262 U.S. at 487.

12. 3 K. DAVIs,
1965); C. WRIGHT,

ADMINSTRATIE LAW TREATISE § 22.09 (1958
HANDBOOK OF THE LAV OF FEmtL COURTS § 13,

& Supp.
at 36-37

(1963); Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MINN. L. REv.
353, 386-91 (1955); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Ac-

tions, 75 HAv. L. REv. 255, 302 (1961); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1266, 1294, 1312 (1961) ; Note,
Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YA.n L.J. 895, 917-18 (1960).
13. See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINiSTRATivE LAW TRATISE § 22.09 (1958); Davis,
Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MINN. L. REV. 353, 386-91
(1955); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv.
L. REv. 255, 302-03 (1961).
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lowed by subsequent cases 14 and it presented an effective barrier
to taxpayer suits of this type.15
The barriers erected in Frothingam were lowered in Fast v.
0ohen' to permit a federal taxpayer to question whether a
congressional spending program violated the establishment clause
of the first amendment. The Court noted the ambiguities in
Frothingham with respect to the basis of that decision (i.e.
constitutional or discretionary)1 and concluded that article III
posed no absolute bar to suits of this type since a taxpayer may
or may not have standing depending on the particular facts. The
Court said that a federal taxpayer has standing to question
whether a congressional statute violates the constitution only
when the statute is an exercise of the taxing and spending
power 18 and the alleged violation is of a specific constitutional
limitation on that power. 19 Here both requirements 'were
14. E.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1938);
Laughlin v. Reynolds, 196 F2d 863, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Elliott v. White,
23 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (suit to enjoin disbursement of federal money
appropriated to pay the salaries of the chaplains of the Senate and the House
of Representatives on the ground that such employment violated the establishment clause of the first amendment dismissed on the authority of Frothingham);
Wheless v. Mellon, 10 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 580
(1926); Gart v. Cole, 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (property owners who
alleged, inter alia, that a federal urban renewal grant, which resulted in a
subsidy to a religious institution, violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment said to lack standing). See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952) ; Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. City of Kennett,
78 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1935) ; Reynolds v. Wade, 139 F. Supp. 171 (D. Alas.
1956); O'Brien v. Corney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D.Mass. 1934).
15. 3 K. DAvis ADmINisTRATE LAW TREAT SE § 22.09, at 243 (1958); C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

§

13, at 37 (1963);

Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MiNx. L. Rnv. 353,
386 (1955) ; Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J.
895, 915 (1960).
16. 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968).
17. See generally materials cited note 13 supra.
18. The taxing and spending powers are derived from U. S. CorsT. art. I,
§ 8. The Court indicated that an expenditure of federal fimds incidental to the
administration of a regulatory statute would not be sufficient to meet the
first requirement of the Flast formula. Moreover, the Court remotely implied
that an expenditure must be substantial in order to qualify under the first
requirement. "[The] constitutional challange is made to an exercise by Congress of its power under Art. I, § 8, to spend for the general welfare, and the
challenged program involves a substantial expenditure of federal tax funds."
88 S.Ct. at 1954.
19. The Court stated the rule a bit more abstractly in terms of there being
"a logical nexus between the status asserted [by a plaintiff] and the claim
sought to be adjudicated." 88 S.Ct. at 1953. The Court said:
[T]he nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it.
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status
and the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer
will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of
exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending
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met; 20 however, in Frothinghamthe second element was lacking
since the tenth amendment is not a specific limitation on the taxing and spending power. Moreover, the Court in FKast said that
Mrs. Frothingham had attempted to assert the interest of the
states in their legislative prerogatives and hence was not a proper
party to bring the action. 21
Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion. He felt that
the majority's standing formula was not a lasting one and that
subsequent cases would result in a gradual erosion of Frothingham; accordingly, he favored overruling Frothingham. Justices
Stewart and Fortas also concurred in separate opinions in which
they indicated that they would confine the holding of the
present case to the proposition that a federal taxpayer has
standing to question whether a federal spending program violates
the establishment clause. Justice Harlan dissented on the
ground that the result in Frotinghamwas the correct one even
though he did "not subscribe to all its reasoning and premises. '22
The majority opinion is in one sense a refinement of the
Frothinghan decision, which had the effect of precluding a
federal taxpayer from attacking a congressional spending program as unconstitutional. 23 In both cases the Court viewed
standing in terms of the degree of injury suffered by the taxpayer or, stated differently, his interest in the outcome of the
clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution .... Secondly the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment
exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not
simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated
to Congress by Art. I, § 8. When both nexuses are established, the
litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the
controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to invoke
a federal court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 1954.
20. The Court concluded that the establishment clause operates as a specific
constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power. The Court did
not discuss whether the Constitution contains other such limitations but
reserved this question for future case development.
21. The Court here seems to classify Frothingham with the Tileston v.
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), line of cases in which a plaintiff who attempts
to assert the rights of some other person is denied standing. Regarding Mrs.
Frothingham's due process argument, the Court said that "the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not protect taxpayers against increases
in tax liability . .

. ."

88 S. Ct. at 1955.

22. 88 S. Ct. at 1961.
23. Notes 14 & 15 rupra.
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litigation. 24 Mrs. Frothingham was denied standing because her
interest in the treasury was too remote. The Court said there
that before it could review and annul an act of Congress the
plaintiff
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
25
indefinite way in common with people generally.
The majority in Flast felt that the essence of standing was
adverseness and that the standing requirement would be met
when the taxpayer's interest in the outcome of the litigation
was sufficient to insure
that the question will be framed with the necessary
specificity, that the issues will be contested with the
necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be
pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the
constitutional challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution.26
The test established by the Court defines that threshold interest necessary to confer standing. When the taxpayer's money
is "extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
24. In Frothinghamthe Court concentrated on the taxpayer's interest in the
funds of the federal treasury. In Flast the Court concentrated on the taxpayer's interest "in being free of taxing and spending in contravention of
specific constitutional limitations imposed upon Congress' taxing and spending
power." 88 S. Ct. at 1955. But see note 18 supra. Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis thinks that the basis for the taxpayers' standing in Flast was financial
even though their motivation was religious. He estimated that each plaintiff's
financial injury could possibly be as high as twelve cents. Professor Davis
favors a standing test based on financial injury which would draw the line
between no injury and some injury, however small. He disagrees with the
Court's emphasis on specific constitutional limitations on the taxing and
spending power, pointing out that "a person who has standing to challenge
for one kind of illegality that adversely affects him necessarily has standing to
challenge for another kind of illegality that adversely affects him to the same
extent." Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 604
(1968).
25. 262 U.S. at 601.
26. 88 S. Ct. at 1955-56. Professor Davis points out that specificity, adverseness, and vigor
may be either present or absent when a taxpayer makes his
challenge under a "specific" clause and that they may be either
present or absent when a taxpayer makes his challenge under
a non-specific clause .... [T]he three items depend

almost

wholly upon the skill of counsel or lack of it and not at all upon the
degree of specificity of the constitutional clause under which challenge is made.
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. Rav. 601, 606 (1968).
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protections against such abuses of legislative power," 27 he suffers
an injury sufficient to confer standing. To the extent that
Fpothinghtam would have required a different result here it
was overruled. 28 The Frothinghamrule still retains some of its
vitality, however, for unless a taxpayer can show a violation
of a specific limitation on the taxing and spending power he will
be denied standing.29 Frothinghan still stands as a barrier to
the federal taxpayer who "seeks to employ a federal court as a
forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the
conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal
System."3 0
MANvToN

M. Gmn=

27. 88 S. Ct. at 1955.
28. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 601, 601
(1968). Of course, as previously mentioned, the Court said that the result
reached on the particular facts in Frothingham was not inconsistent with the
Flast formula since Mrs. Frothingham did not allege a specific violation of
the taxing and spending power. The effect of the Flast formula will be to
require a different result in cases like Elliott v. White, 23 F2d 997 (D.C. Cir.
1928) and Gart v. Cole, 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), in which suits
alleging violations of specific constitutional prohibitions on the taxing and
spending power of Congress were dismissed on the authority of Frothinghain.
For a brief statement describing the Elliott and Cart cases see note 14 supra.
29. The extent of Frothingham's vitality will depend on the number of
"specific" clauses which the Constitution contains in addition to the establishment clause. See note 20 supra.
30. 88 S. Ct. at 1956.
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CRIMINAL LAW-Insanity-Adoption by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals of the American Law Institute formulation of
the tests of insanity-United ,State8 v. Chandler. (4th Cir.
1968).
:En banc hearings were held separately in two cases' to better
enable the court to examine the standards of mental responsibility
used to determine the guilt of the defendants charged with crime.
In the first case considered, Rosalind Chandler, after an evening
of drinking with her husband and two other men, discovered a
letter to her husband from another woman. A violent argument
ensued. Chandler struck his wife, and she retaliated by stabbing
him with a knife, killing him immediately. She soon became
repentant and later hysterical. Mrs. Chandler was given a
pretrial psychiatric examination which produced a diagnosis of
"passive aggressive personality with alcoholic features." She
had a history of criminal conduct beginning at an early age and
was known to be an excessive drinker. A psychiatrist testified at
her trial that such a person would tend to exaggerate human
characteristics and was capable of giving expression to anger by
acts of violence. In the opinion of the psychiatrist, Mrs. Chandler
could easily distinguish between right and wrong and was
capable of conforming her conduct to what she knew to be right.
He classified her condition as a mental disease and testified that
the violent act she committed was a probable result of this mental
disease coupled with passion and anger. She was tried for
murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
In the second case the defendant conspired with a policeman to rob a bank in Maryland. Two weeks after the initial
meeting, they attempted the robbery, but were caught and
arrested. At the trial, psychiatrists testified that the defendant
Leister grew up with a sense of rejection and animosity towards
society as the result of an unhappy childhood. Psychiatrists
further stated that Leister was not a psychotic, and that normally
he could conform his conduct to the standards of behavior set
by the law. Under emotional stress, Leister would tend to act
irresponsibly, but at all times had the capacity to control his
acts if he so desired. On the strength of that testimony, Leister
1. United States v. Chandler and United States v. Leister were reported

together as the question presented in both cases concerned the proper test to
decide the question of mental competence. At the lower court level, Chandler
was tested according to the irresistible impulse supplement to the M'Naghten
rule, while Leister was tested under the American Law Institute formulation
as well as the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests.
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was judged mentally competent and found guilty of bank robbery. The district court stated that he was suffering from a
mental disease, but noted there was nothing impulsive about
the robbery as it took two weeks of planning. Upon conviction,
Leister was committed to an institution for psychiatric examination under the federal statute2 which provides for commitment of a convicted person so as to enable the court to obtain
more detailed information to aid in determining the sentence
to be imposed. The psychiatrists, upon Leister's commitment,
found him not to be a psychotic, but stated that any successful
treatment of his mental illness would require a long period of
personal psychiatric care. Based upon this report, the district
court sentenced Leister to 15 years, eligible for parole at anytime
at the discretion of the Board of Parole.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, both
cases affirmed. A person is responsible for criminal conduct
unless, if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease of defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. 3 United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920
(4th Cir. 1968).
Itwas contended on appeal that both defendants suffered from
a condition classified by psychiatrists as a mental disease and
neither would have committed the criminal act had there not been
such a disease. This contention was based upon the test set forth
in Durham v. United States,4 decided in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.
The court first approached the contentions of the defendants
through a detailed study of the history of the various tests of
mental responsibility. In Hadfield's Case,5 an old English case,
the issue of mental competency was posed to the jury in the
form of whether or not the accused's act was "so under the
guidance of reason" as to make him answerable for it. This
test presented both the cognitive and voluntary aspects of the
criminal act to the jury. However, in M'Naghtem's Case," the
House of Lords changed the question to the familiar right and
2. 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (b) (1964).
3. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962)

(states the negative implication

of this holding). This provision is quoted in the text accompanying note 16
infra.

4. 214 F2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

5. 27 State Trials 1281 (1800).
6. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843).
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wrong language which is prevalent today. This change was
shown in the language of the House of Lords' opinion which
stated that there should be an acquittal if
the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did
kmow it, that he did not know that he was doing what
was wrong.7
The M'Aaghten test was later supplemented by the "irresistible
impulse" test, which stated that one could not be held criminally
responsible if he knew the wrongful nature of his act but could
not control his conduct because of a mental disease or defect."
The M'Naghten test was criticized for basing the question almost
exclusively upon the cognitive aspects of the problem." It was
also criticized by psychiatrists who claimed that they felt incapable of testifying under the rigid standards set forth in the
test.19 The M'Naghten rule attempted to define insanity in terms
of a mere symptom of mental illness, which many felt was much
too narrow a ground.
Basing its decision upon these and other considerations, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Durham v. United
States" overruled the A'Naghten test as the exclusive criterion
for determining insanity in the District of Columbia. The
court stated that the test was inadequate because it did not
respond to modern psychiatric advances and also, because the
rule was based upon one symptom which could not be applied
in all situations. The court set forth the simple rule that "an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect." 12 The term
"mental disease or defect" was defined by the same court in a
later case' 3 to include "any abnormal condition of the mind
which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and
substantially impairs behavior controls." 14 Recently, the same
7. Id. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
8. The "irresistible impulse" test has been used as a supplement to the
M'Naghten rule. E.g., Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957) ;
Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702 150 N.E2d (1958); Thompson v.

Virginia, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284 (92).
9. Sobeloff, From McNaghten to Durham and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.j. 793
(1955).
10.
11.
12.
13.

Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CH. L. Ry. 339 (1955).
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Id. at 874-75.
McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

14. Id. at 851.
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court has restricted the use of conclusionary terms by psychiatrists on the grounds that they tend to confuse juries in many
15
cases.
In 1953, the American Law Institute began a study of the
problem, and in 1962 adopted the following proposed test as
part of the Model Penal Code:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law.
(2) The term 'mental disease or defect' does not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.' 6
This test has been widely accepted. 17 Some courts of appeals
have adopted it without question,' 8 while others have modeled
their own tests after it. 19
Even though the Fourth Circuit indicated that the American
Law Institute test was the preferred test, it did not want to
make the mistake of saying that this was the only language that
could be used. The court realized that there should be room
for adaptation of the language to particular cases as well as
for later changes that might be desirable. The court even went so
far as to recognize some of the more desirable changes that could
be made in the area of mental competency. It proposed that
there should be some congressional action taken to insure federal commitment of a defendant acquitted on a defense of insanity. There is such a statute, but it applies only to the District
of Columbia. 20 The court further noted that there are many
defendants who are criminally responsible but still require psychiatric treatment. Some of these offenders could be more
easily rehabilitated in certain cases than those judged criminally
15. Washington v. United States, 390 F2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).

17. Comment, Criminal Law-Inmanity--The American Law Institute Formu-

lation and Its Implications for South Carolina, 18 S.C.L. REv. 661 (1966).
18. United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967) ; United States v.

Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
19. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967); Wion v. United
States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Currens, 290 F2d
751 (3d Cir. 1961).
20. 24 U.S.C. § 211 (1964).
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irresponsible. Therefore, the court recognized that the resolution
of the question of criminal responsibility was not the only problem to be solved.
The court continued by saying that eventually the solution
might be for penologists and psychiatrists to decide the issue of
criminal responsibility and also to decide the type and duration
of punishment to be received. These issues would be completely
removed from the trial itself. The court noted, however, that
the sciences of penology and psychiatry have not advanced far
enough to handle such responsibilities. By proposing such a
procedure, the court recognized that the jury system may not be
the best instrument to decide the issues of sentencing or insanity.
Jurors do not have the knowledge to answer diagnostic questions
or to prescribe punishment. The question of punishment should
be decided by judges who can take advantage of their experience,
as well as pre-sentence reports. This would be possible under
statutes such as the one in the District of Columbia. 2 1
The court further noted that the contentions of Chandler and
Leister were based upon an erroneous interpretation of the
Durham rule, as the rule had since been modified. The court
stated that the criminal law exists for the protection of society.
Without harming society, the law could exclude from punishment
those who do not have substantial control over their own conduct. However, the law cannot extend immunity from its sanctions to all people who may have some psychiatric explanation
for their deviant conduct, or the law would not function to
protect society. The law must proceed on the assumption that
any individual who has the substantial capacity for choice
should be subject to punishment under the law. On the basis of
this reasoning, the court rejected the defendants' contentions
as being inconsistent with the express language of the American
Law Institute formulation of the test of insanity, which it
approved.
L. GRAY GIMDM, JR.

21. 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1964).
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-Traffic Control Devices-A
"35 M.P.H." sign in black legend on yellow background used
with "School Bus Crossing" warning sign establishes maximum
legal rate. Rochester v. Bussey (S.C. 1968).
The South Carolina Highway Department had erected two
signs to control traffic at an intersection on one of the state's
highways. Both signs were placed on the same post, one above
the other, and both were in black legend on a yellow background.
The top sign read "School Bus Crossing"; the bottom sign read
"35 M.P.H." A collision at this intersection resulted in the
present tort action. At trial, the plaintiff sought to establish
that the defendant was negligent per se in exceeding the speed
of 35 miles per hour. The defendant offered in evidence the
testimony of the Highway Department engineer in charge of
erecting signs in that area and also that of a highway patrolman
to the effect that the signs did not establish a speed limit, but
were placed there for advisory purposes only, to warn motorists
of a hazard at the intersection. Their testimony was based on the
Highway Department Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. The trial judge refused to charge the jury that the signs
established a maximum speed zone, as the plaintiff had requested,
but submitted the question of the effect of the signs to the jury.
From a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The
South Carolina Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded.
An official Highway Department "35 M.P.H." sign used in
conjunction with a "School Bus Crossing" sign establishes the
maximum legal speed in that zone even though the signs appear
in black legend on a yellow background and are designated as
warning signs in the Highway Department manual. Rochester
v. Bussey, 162 S.E.2d 841 (S.C. 1968).'
1. This same case was before the court in Rochester v. North Greenville
Junior College, 249 S.C. 123, 153 S.E.2d 121 (1967). The trial judge had
struck as irrelevant that part of the complaint which described the "35 M.P.H."
speed limit sign. The judge reasoned that the lower speed limit was designed

to protect the occupants of school busses and would have no bearing in this
case since a school bus was not involved in the accident and the accident
occurred at a time when school busses would not be on the highway.
It is clear that in order to establish per se tort liability based on breach of

a statutory standard of care the plaintiff must show that he was within the

class of persons for whose protection the statute was enacted. Carma v.
Swindler, 228 S.C. 550, 91' S.E2d 254 (1956); Wright v. South Carolina
Power Co., 205 S.C. 327, 31 S.E2d 904 (1944).

When a plaintiff is not

within the protected class, it is said that the defendant's breach of the
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In no section of the South Carolina Code of Laws is there an
express explanation of the meaning of a "35 M.P.H." sign in
black lettering on a yellow background used in conjunction with
a "School Bus Crossing" sign of like coloring. The court applied
sections 46-301, 46-302, 46-304, and 46-367 in determining the
2
meaning of this sign.
Section 46-301 authorizes the Highway Department to "adopt
a manual of standards and specifications for a uniform system of
traffic-control devices .

...

" By the terms of section 46-302

[t]he Department may place and maintain such trafficcontrol devices, conforming to its manual and specifications, upon all State highways as it shall deem
necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions
of this chapter or to regulate, warn or guide traffic.
Section 46-304 requires motorists to "obey the instructions of
any official traffic-control device .

.

. 2"3 Section 46-367 au-

thorizes the establishment of speed zones by the Highway Department
[w]henever the Department shall determine upon the
basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that
any prima facie speed herein set forth is greater or less
than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to
exist at any . . . place . . . , the Department may de-

termine and declare a reasonable and safe prima facie
speed limit thereat which shall be effective . . . when

appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected ....
The court interpreted sections 46-301 and 46-302 as dealing
"generally with the authority of the Highway Department to
erect traffic control devices" and section 46-367 as dealing "specistatutory standard of care was not a proximate cause of the injury. Carma
v. Swindler, supra.
In this earlier appeal, however, the supreme court held that the sign was not
erected only to protect school children and that its mandate was not limited
to the hours when school busses normally operate. The question whether or
not the sign was merely advisory was not decided.
2. The statutes in the code dealing with speed restrictions were amended
in 1966, but the court applied the sections as they read before amendment
since the accident occurred in 1963. The 1966 amendments did not affect sections 46-301, 46-302 and 46-304. Section 46-367 was renumbered in 1966
but remains basically the same insofar as this decision is concerned. Its
provisions are now found in S.C. CODE AxN. § 46-362 (Supp. 1968).
3. An "official traffic control device" is defined as any device "erected
by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction for the purpose
of regulating, warning or guiding traffic ....
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-262
(1962).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1969

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 10
1968]

16RECENT

DECISIONS

fically with the authority of the Department to alter statutory
speed limits."4 Concluding from the record that the erection of
the sign resulted from a "determination that a hazard existed
which made a speed in excess of that posted unreasonable and
unsafe under average conditions," 5 the court ruled that the

requirements of section 46-367 had been met and that a speed
limit was thereby established.
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached different results in
determining the legal effect of similar traffic control devices.
The New York Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices
classifies a "35 M.P.H." sign such as the one used in the
Rochester case as a "recommended" speed sign as distinguished
from a speed limit sign.6 This distinction was upheld in Nourse
v. Welsh,1 a case in which a New York court held that a sign
indicating an intersection on the road ahead by two crossed
arrows when used with a "20 M.P.H." sign did not create a
speed zone but was a warning sign. This case may be distinguished from Rochester,however, since the New York manual is
incorporated into Title 15 of the Code, Rules, and Regulations
of New York.
In Garst v. Obenchain, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded the decision of the lower court on the
ground that the trial judge had erred in instructing the jury
that violation of a sign utilizing a directional arrow to warn
of a curve on the road ahead in conjunction with a sign reading
"Maximum Safe Speed 35 Miles Per Hour" constituted negligence as a matter of law. The court held that "the maximum
safe speed sign . . .was not a speed limitation sign but a cau-

tion or warning sign which the jury might have considered as
one of the circumstances in determining what was a reasonable
speed under all the circumstances. '9 Although the Virginia
Highway Department has adopted a manual on uniform traffic
control devices' 0 pursuant to statutory authority,"1 no reference
was made to it in the court's opinion.
4. 162 S.E2d at 842.
5. Id. The Department engineer testified that the sign was erected "at
the request of the people connected with the school busses inthe area ...
Record at 40.
6. N.Y. DEP'T. OF TRANSP., STATE OF N.Y. MANUAL ON UrNFom TRAmc
CONTROL DEVICES 151 (1967).
7. 23 App. Div. 2d 618, 257 N.Y.S2d 96 (1965).
8. 196 Va. 664, 85 S.E2d 207 (1955).
9. Id. at 671, 85 S.E2d at 212.
10. VA. DEP'T or HIGHWAYS, COMMONWEALTH OF VA. MANUAL OF UNIroam TRAFFIc CONTROL DEVICES (1960).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-173 (1967).
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The South Carolina court's decision that the "35 M.P.H."
sign operated as a regulatory sign fixing the legal rate of speed
in the area means that violation of that speed limit amounts to
negligence per se. 12 It also means that the violator has committed a misdeameanor punishable "by fine of not more than
one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than
thirty days."18 Furthermore, the speed limit established by this
sign applies regardless of the time of day. According to the
court, the sign neither expressed nor implied an application4
limited to those hours in which school busses normally operate.'
In addition, the court's holding clearly indicates that sections
46-301, 46-302, and 46-304, taken together, cannot be construed
as a wholesale incorporation of the manual into the code:
The fact that the "35 M.P.H." sign carried black
lettering on a yellow background, was used in connection
with the "School Bus Crossing" sign, and was designated
in the Highway Department Manual as a "maximum
advisory speed sign," is not determinative of its legal
effect. Such must be determined from the wording of
the sign in the light of statutory provisions relative
to the effect to be given official signs erected by the
Department to control traffic.15
The Rochester decision clarifies a confusing area of the code
which deals with the Highway Department's manual and legal
effect to be given traffic control devices of the type involved in
this case. No doubt it also brings some certainty to a perplexing
dilemma faced by motorists when confronted by such a sign on
a highway on which the speed limit otherwise posted is higher.
The court's decision properly takes the responsibility for determining the legal effect of the signs away from the jury and
places it on the court. The opinion, nevertheless, leaves other
related questions and problems unanswered.
Whether or not the decision will be applied in all cases in
which a "35 M.P.H." sign is used with a warning sign is not
clear. Although the speed limit thus established is effective
regardless of the time of day, is it also effective regardless of
the day of the week or of the year? Does the fact that generally
schools are not in session and school busses are generally not in
12.
13.
14.
15.

Cirsosky v. Smathers, 128 S.C. 358, 122 S.E. 864 (1924).
S.C. CODE ANu.§ 46-689 (1962).
162 S.E2d at 843.
Id.
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use on Sundays and certain holidays during the year make any
difference? There are a large number of signs designated in the
Highway Department manual as warning signs with which the
"35 M.P.H." sign may be used. 16 For example, if it were used in
connection with a "Drive-In Theater" warning sign,' 7 does the
Rochester decision mean that a speed limit of 35 miles per hour
is fixed regardless of the time of day? Or does this sign imply
that the limit is effective only during hours of darkness when
the theater is open for business?
Another question is raised by the penal consequences for
exceeding the speed as posted on such a sign. Other signs which
regulate speed on the state's highways have the words "Speed
Limit" written in black lettering on a white background. The
Drivers' Handbook, which must be mastered by an applicant in
order to qualify for a driver's license, classifies these signs as
official speed signs, whereas signs of the type involved in the
Rochester case are classified as warning signs.' 8
[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible
the line should be clear. 19
Has a motorist who violates the speed limit indicated by such a
sign been given sufficient fair warning that he may be fined or
imprisoned ?2o
The fact that many non-resident motorists travel South Carolina highways also presents a problem in light of the result
reached in Rochester. With the modern volume of interstate
highway traffic, uniformity in the application of traffic control
devices is obviously in the interest of public safety.21 Unfortunately, there is too little case law of the particular type involved
in this case to establish any sort of trend toward uniformity.
16. S.C. STATE HIGmHwAY DEP'T, S.C. MANUAL ON UNnroeu TPAc CONTROL DEWcEs 1-204 to -232 (1966).
17. Id. at 1-232.
18. S.C. STATE HIGHWAY DEP'T, DivEs' HAwDooE: FoR S.C. 26, 73, 77,

80 (1967 ed.).
19. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
20. It should be noted that this argument was one of those urged by the
defendant in his petition for a rehearing which was denied.
21. See FLA. CODE ANN. § 317.021 (Supp. 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1609
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-508 (Supp. 1967) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-173
(1967); 1 D. BLASHFiEL, CYcLOPEDIA OF AUTomoB0nI LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 24-25 (1948); U.S. DEP'T OF CommEacE, BUREAU OF PUB. Ros., MANUAL
ON UNIFORm TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICEs (1961).
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Most states, through their respective highway departments, have
adopted manuals similar to South Carolina's. Most of these
are patterned after a national Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, which classifies the speed sign involved in the
Rochester case as a warning sign. 22 "It is not a regulatory sign,
23
as the speed shown is not intended as an enforceable limit."
Therefore, for motorists from states which adopt this interpretation, the effect of the sign in South Carolina is potentially confusing and dangerous.
MARVIN QUATTLEBAIYhI

22. E.g., S.C. STATE HIGHWAY DEPT., S.C. MANuAL ON UNIFoRm TRA

CONTROL DEVICES xvi (1966).
23. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEvICES

c

BuREAu OF PUB. ROADs, MANuAL ON UNI72 (1961).
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